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The Relation between Memory and Decision-Making in
Multiple Sclerosis Patients
Janina A. Hoffmann 1,2,∗, Lena Bareuther2,3,∗, Roger Schmidt4,∗, Christian
Dettmers4,∗
Abstract
Background. Impairments in long-term and working memory are widespread
in Multiple Sclerosis (MS), setting on in early disease stages. These memory
impairments may limit patients’ ability to take informed and competent med-
ical decisions, too. In healthy populations, memory abilities predict decision
quality across a wide range of tasks. These studies suggest that higher working
memory capacity supports decisions in cognitively taxing tasks, whereas bet-
ter semantic memory facilitates decisions in tasks requiring knowledge retrieval.
In individuals with MS, previous studies have linked less accurate decisions to
memory deficits and reduced executive functioning, too. However, these studies
focussed on decisions under risk and did not broadly assess decision making
skills. We aimed to fill this gap in a cross-sectional study. Methods. Hundred
thirty-seven participants with MS were recruited during their stay in an MS
specialized rehabilitation centre. In a first test session, participants completed
a standardized test battery for working memory and semantic memory, the in-
ventory for memory diagnostics. In a second test session, participants filled out
the Adult Decision Making Competence battery (A-DMC). This version of the
A-DMC measured decision making competence on five subscales: Resistance to
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Framing Effects, Under/Overconfidence, Applying Decision Rules, Consistency
in Risk Perception, and Resistance to Sunk Cost Effects. In addition, partic-
ipants were screened for depression and cognitive fatigue. Results. Working
memory was impaired in most participants, whereas semantic memory was not
impaired. To understand which memory abilities underlie distinct components
of decision making in people with MS, we used structural equation modelling.
Replicating previous findings in a healthy sample, working memory capacity was
associated with the ability to recall semantic knowledge. Participants with lower
working memory capacity were less resistant to framing effects and adhered to
decision rules less. In contrast, participants with worse semantic memory as-
sessed their own knowledge less accurately, perceived risks less consistently, and
made more errors in applying decision rules. Cognitive fatigue and depression
unlikely explain these relationships. Conclusions. Taken together, our study
suggests that the memory problems, frequently reported in MS patients, may
reach out to higher-order cognitive functions, such as decision making skills.
Supporting shared decision-making and patient autonomy within MS thus re-
quires to take memory impairments into account and to match the information
provided to the patient’s memory abilities.
Keywords: Decision Making; Long-Term Memory; Short-Term Memory;
Multiple Sclerosis; Shared Decision Making; Choice Behavior
1. Introduction
One of the most prevalent and earliest symptoms of MS are cognitive dys-
functions, such as short-term and long-term memory impairments, with preva-
lence rates of 43-70% [1, 2, 3]. Previous research has, however, often neglected
consequences of memory impairments for well-being, quality of life, and pa-5
tient decisions [4]. For instance, many patients prefer to take an active role in
treatment decisions, especially those patients who experience more disabilities
[5].
Importantly, cognitive abilities may interact with patients’ ability to take
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informed and competent medical and life decisions. In healthy populations,10
memory abilities have been shown to predict decision quality and decision mak-
ing skills across a wide range of cognitive tasks [6, 7, 8, 9, 10] and real-life settings
[11]. In persons with MS, worse decisions have been traced back to deficits in
processing speed, visual memory performance, reduced memory, and executive
functioning [12, 13]. Most studies on persons with MS focussed on a narrow15
subset of decisions, namely decisions under risks [14, 13, 15] in which choice
outcomes are known and realized with a predefined probability. Yet, decision
making requires executing a variety of subprocesses: estimating the likelihood of
outcomes, evaluating decision outcomes, integrating outcomes and beliefs into
a decision, and metacognitive skills [6].20
In healthy adults, working memory, the ability to simultaneously store and
manipulate information [16], likely underpins the evaluation of decision out-
comes and the accurate integration of outcomes and beliefs into a decision.
Specifically, evaluating decision outcomes requires to focus attention on the
relevant information and to ignore irrelevant information, whereas integrating25
outcomes and beliefs requires mentally updating the information in working
memory [17]. In this vein, previous research has consistently shown that work-
ing memory predicts decision performance in tasks that require rule application
[7, 17, 8, 9] or that require to ignore how a problem is described or framed (Re-
sistance to Framing, [8]). Metacognitive skills, the ability to assess the quality30
of one’s own knowledge and decisions, have been suggested to demand work-
ing memory [8], too. Especially, taking disconfirming evidence into account,
a cognitively taxing process, should reduce overconfidence and lead to better
calibrated judgments [18]. In contrast, semantic memory likely predicts perfor-
mance in decision tasks that demand a high amount of background knowledge35
[8]. For instance, assessing risks consistently requires the knowledge of the laws
of probability and, thus, retrieval of knowledge from semantic memory. Simi-
larly, ignoring unrecoverable investments requires the normative knowledge that
future decisions should be independent of past costs. In line with this idea, se-
mantic memory is predictive of the ability to perceive risks consistently as well40
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as the ability to ignore unrecoverable investments [8]. We aimed to replicate
these relationships in individuals with MS and to examine how individual differ-
ences in memory abilities relate to five aspects of decision making competence,
as measured by the multi-dimensional Adult Decision-Making Competence bat-
tery (A-DMC, [6]).45
Memory impairments in MS may be caused by comorbid diseases, such as
depression, or disease-related symptoms, such as cognitive fatigue, too. De-
pression may adversely impact on working memory [19, 20], whereas cognitive
fatigue has been related to alertness and vigiliance [21]. If fatigue and depres-
sion impede memory performance, those impairments may in turn harm decision50
making skills.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Hundred thirty-seven participants with a MS diagnosis (98 women,71.5%,
MAge = 49.4 years, SDAge = 10.4 years, range: 19-76 years) were recruited55
during their stay in the Kliniken Schmieder Konstanz, Germany. The Kliniken
Schmieder is a MS specialised neurological rehabilitation centre that admits MS
patients for an interdisciplinary cognitive and physical rehabilitation treatment.
To recruit participants, all incoming patients were screened for a MS diagnosis as
the admission reason. Inclusion criteria were: a confirmed MS diagnosis accord-60
ing to the revised McDonald criteria [22], Age ≥ 18, native German speakers,
no severe visual deficits or other neurological diseases. Patients with a relapse
or steroid treatment within the last four weeks were excluded. All MS patients
fulfilling these criteria were consecutively asked to participate in the study.
Educational background was comparable to the average population (18.2%65
Hauptschule, i.e. degree after grade 9, 44.5% Realschule, i.e. degree after
grade 10, 37.2% Abitur, i.e. degree after grade 12-13). Eighty-five participants
(62.0%) were diagnosed with RRMS, 37 (27.0%) with SPMS, and 15 (10.9%)
with PPMS [23]. Participants have been living with the disease on average for
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17.5 years (SD = 9.6) with mostly mild to moderate disease symptoms (EDSS =70
4.0, SD = 2.1, range: 1.0-8.0, EDSS = Expanded Disability Status Scale [24]).
Sixty-two participants were at least partially retired from work. Among these
participants, 51 participants stated disability and 11 participants stated age as
the reason for their retirement. A comparison with an unselected MS patient
sample at the Kliniken Schmieder suggests that the recruited participants were75
representative for the patient population.
2.2. Memory tests
We assessed working memory and semantic memory with the inventory for
memory diagnostics (Inventar zur Gedaechtnisdiagnostik, IGD [25]), an estab-
lished normed German memory battery.80
2.2.1. Working memory
The four working memory tests (subtests A2-A5) measure the ability to
shortly store information, to manipulate it, and to shift attention between dif-
ferent sources of information. In the digit span task, a sequence of digits is read
out to each participant and the participant has to remember the digits in correct85
order. In the verbal working memory task, the participant has to remember all
words containing the letter ”r” from a list of 14 words read out to her. In the
visual working memory task, participants remember the position and alignment
of seven lines and later place the lines into a blank square. In the executive
control task, nine boxes contain a different number of grey and black triangles90
and circles. Participants have to count and remember the number of grey items
in each box with the color of triangles and circles alternating between boxes.
2.2.2. Semantic memory
The semantic memory tests (subtests B1-B4) measure previously acquired
semantic knowledge across four domains: object, concept, word, and factual95
knowledge. For instance, the object knowledge task asks participants to map
typical features (e.g., ”weight”: ”100kg”, ”12kg”, ”1g”, ”200g”, ”1000kg”,
5
”30kg”) onto five different objects (e.g., ”feather”, ”car”, ”bike”, ”refrigerator”,
”pocketbook”).
2.3. Decision-making competence100
We translated the A-DMC to German according to a committee approach.
A professional interpreter back-translated the German version to English. As
in the Italian version, we modified some items because of cultural differences
[7]. A sample of healthy relatives (n = 87, 51 females, MAge = 48.9, SDAge
= 14.4) completed the translated A-DMC in paper-pencil format. Reliabilities105
were comparable to previous studies [8], ranging from Cronbach’s α = .51 for
Resistance to Sunk Costs to α = .78 for Resistance to Framing.
2.3.1. Resistance to Framing
How a decision problem is described or framed often affects decisions in
formally equivalent problems [26]. The Resistance to Framing task measures110
how resistant people are to framing with seven attribute framing and seven
risky-choice problems. In attribute framing, for instance, the effectiveness of a
new condom is described with a 95% success rate in the positive frame and with
a 5% failure rate in the negative frame. Participants express endorsement on a
6-point Likert scale, ranging for instance from ”Insecure” to ”Secure”. A lower115
mean absolute difference between the ratings for positive and negative frames
indicates a higher resistance to the framing effect (reverse coded).
2.3.2. Under/Overconfidence
The Under/Overconfidence task measures the degree to which the confidence
in one’s own knowledge reflects also its accuracy. Participants answered 34120
true/false general knowledge statements (e.g., ”There is no way to improve your
memory.”) and indicated how confident they were of their answer on a scale from
50% (”just guessing”) to 100% (”absolutely sure”). A smaller absolute difference
between the percentage of correct answers and average confidence reflects less
under/overconfidence.125
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2.3.3. Applying Decision Rules
The Applying Decision Rules task assesses how accurately participants apply
a specified decision rule. In ten multi-attribute decisions, participants choose
between fictitious DVD players with different features (e.g., sound quality) ac-
cording to a predefined decision rule. The complexity of the decision rules varies130
from rules considering only one attribute (e.g. sound quality) to rules integrat-
ing information from all presented attributes. Task performance is measured as
the proportion of correctly chosen DVD-Players.
2.3.4. Consistency in Risk Perception
Participants judge the probability of ten events (e.g., dying in a terrorist135
attack) happening within a timespan of one and five years on a scale from 0%
(”no chance”) to 100% (”certain”). Probability judgments are scored based on
their agreement with probability principles. For instance, participants should
judge the probability for an event happening within the next year as lower as the
probability of the same event happening within the next five years. Performance140
is evaluated by the proportion of correctly applied probability principles to the
20 event pairs.
2.3.5. Resistance to Sunk Costs
Normatively, one should ignore unrecoverable past investments and concen-
trate on the future consequences of a decision. One’s ability to ignore prior145
invested unrecoverable financial and time costs (sunk costs) is measured by the
Resistance to Sunk Costs scale (e.g., ”...you ordered a big dessert..., after a few
bites you find you are full: would you be more likely to eat more or to stop eating
it?”). In ten problems, participants express a preference for the sunk-cost option
(e.g., ”most likely to continue eating”) compared to the normatively correct op-150
tion (e.g., ”most likely to stop eating”) on a 6-point Likert scale. Performance
is calculated as the average rating for the normatively correct option.
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2.4. Clinical Assessments
Disability was assessed by experienced neurologists with the Expanded Dis-
ability Status Scale (EDSS [24]). Medical data was collected from the clini-155
cal record. The subjective severity of cognitive fatigue was assessed with the
cognitive functioning subscale from the Fatigue Scale for Motor and Cognitive
Functions (FSMC [27]); the severity of a depressive disorder was measured with
the Rasch-based Depression Screening (DESC-II [28]).
2.5. Procedure160
Participants gave written informed consent in line with the Declaration of
Helsinki after reading the study description on an information sheet and a per-
sonal meeting with one researcher. Participants were tested in two sessions in
their room. Testing times matched the participants’ best daily performance. In
the first session, participants were first tested on working memory, next seman-165
tic memory, and finally filled out the depression and cognitive fatigue scales.
In the second session, participants filled out the A-DMC questionnaire in the
order: (1) positively framed Resistance to Framing, (2) Under/Overconfidence,
(3) Applying Decision Rules, (4) Consistency in Risk Perception, (5) Resistance
to Sunk Costs, (6) negatively framed Resistance to Framing. Participants with170
physical problems received assistance in filling out the questionnaires. Partici-
pants received feedback about their test performance if desired.
2.6. Analysing the relationship between memory performance and decision mak-
ing
To understand to what degree memory predicts decision making in individ-175
uals with MS, we first established a measurement model for ”working mem-
ory” and ”semantic memory” within a confirmatory factor analysis. This mea-
surement model specified which memory tests measure the latent constructs
”working memory” and ”semantic memory” and estimated how strongly work-
ing memory and semantic memory are correlated.180
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In a next step, we tested in a regression-based structural model which mem-
ory construct predicted decision making as measured with the A-DMC subtest
[29, 8, 30]. In line with previous studies [17, 8], we predicted that working mem-
ory facilitates decisions in cognitive demanding tasks (Resistance to Framing,
Under/Overconfidence, Applying Decision Rules), whereas semantic memory185
helps knowledge-based decisions (Consistency in Risk Perception, Resistance
to Sunk Costs) or tasks requiring the comprehension of complex instructions
(Applying the Decision Rules). To test these assumptions, we compared the
candidate model that, for instance, postulated a relationship between working
memory and resistance to framing, against two competitors: A null model spec-190
ifying that memory does not predict resistance to framing and a full-path model
specifying that working memory and semantic memory contribute to resistance
to framing. If only working memory predicts resistance to framing, then this
candidate model should outperform the null model, but adding semantic mem-
ory as a predictor should not further improve model fit.195
Regression weights were tested using χ2 difference tests that compared the
model with the hypothesised relationship to competitors without that relation-
ship. All analyses were controlled for age and education 5. Because of deviations
from multivariate normality, we estimated all models using a maximum likeli-
hood estimator with robust standard errors (MLM) and Satorra-scaled χ2 values200
(scaling factor, SF, for χ2 difference tests, [31]). Model fit was evaluated with
several fit indices (reference thresholds in brackets): χ2, the standardized root-
mean-square residual (SRMR < .06), the comparative fit index (CFI > .95),
and the root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA < .05, [32, 30]).
5Controlling in addition for EDSS did not alter any major conclusion. Semantic memory
predicted slightly worse how accurately participants followed decision rules when accounting
for individual differences in working memory, ∆χ2(1) = 2.7, p = .102, but the estimated
coefficient did not change in magnitude, b = 0.25 (0.13).
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3. Results205
3.1. Descriptive statistics
Normed percentile ranks based on the inventory for memory diagnostics
indicated that working memory was below average in participants (M = 34.2
%, SD = 31.0, table 1 for descriptive statistics for all measures), but semantic
memory was not impaired (M = 47.5 %, SD = 36.5). Our participants with210
diagnosed MS performed similar to healthy participants on decision making
tasks [6, 8]. Most participants reported moderate (N = 21, 15.3%) or severe
(N = 73, 53.3 %) cognitive fatigue symptoms and only a few participants did
not experience any (N = 27, 19.7%) or mild symptoms (N = 16, 11.7%). 63
participants could be classified as experiencing a depressive episode according215
to the Rasch-based depression screening (46%).
3.2. Measuring working and semantic memory
We expected that all working memory tests relate to the construct ”working
memory” and all semantic memory tests relate to the construct ”semantic mem-
ory”. In addition, participants with a better working memory may also possess220
a better semantic memory, that is, ”working memory” and ”semantic memory”
are moderately correlated [17, 8]. Although this measurement model outper-
formed a model assuming that working and semantic memory are uncorrelated,
∆χ2(1) = 28.5, p < .001, or a model assuming that working and semantic mem-
ory are identical, ∆χ2(1) = 10.2, p < .001 (see Table 2 for fit indices), not all fit225
indices indicated a satisfying fit. Modification indices suggested an insufficient
discriminant validity of word knowledge (MI = 12.9) so that we excluded word
knowledge. The revised model without word knowledge proposed that partici-
pants with a better working memory more successfully retrieve knowledge from
semantic memory (Figure 1).230
3.3. Predicting decision making with memory
In most cognitively demanding tasks, participants with higher working mem-
ory scored higher on decision making competence (see Table 3 for model fits).
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Figure 1: The revised measurement model suggesting a correlation between working memory
and semantic memory. Arrows indicate standardized factor loadings; double-headed arrows
indicate correlations; residual variances are displayed at the arrows to the memory tests.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Participants with higher working memory more likely resisted framing effects,
∆χ2(1) = 12.2, p < .001, but semantic memory did not increase resistance to235
framing further, ∆χ2(1) = 1.7, p = .189. Likewise, in the over-/underconfidence
task, working memory predicted how well participants’ confidence ratings repre-
sented their knowledge, ∆χ2(1) = 6.2, p = .01. Yet, predicting over-/underconfidence
jointly with working and semantic memory further improved the prediction
∆χ2(1) = 15.2, p < .001. Regression weights in this model suggest that par-240
ticipants with a better semantic memory successfully adjust their confidence
ratings to the knowledge they possess, but working memory contributes little to
well-calibrated confidence ratings. Finally, applying decision rules should draw
on working memory and semantic memory. In line with this idea, participants
with a higher working memory applied decision rules more accurately, ∆χ2 (1)245
= 34.2, p < .001, as did participants with a better semantic memory, ∆χ2(1)
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= 32.9, p < .001. Jointly considering both memory abilities further improved
model fit, ∆χ2(1) = 5.8, p = .016, but the higher regression weight for working
memory indicates that working memory may be more important for following
decision rules.250
In knowledge-based tasks, participants with a better semantic memory per-
ceived risks more consistently, ∆χ2(1) = 9.5, p < .002, but participants with
a higher working memory did not, ∆χ2(1) = 3.7, p = .054. Finally, a better
semantic memory did not help to resist sunk costs, ∆χ2(1) = 0.5, p = .497, nor
did working memory explain better why people resist sunk costs, as indicated255
by the unsatisfying model fits. Thus, memory did not contribute to resisting
sunk costs.
3.4. Cognitive fatigue and depression as predictors for memory
Depression and cognitive fatigue were expected to impede memory and, in
turn, to be negatively correlated with decision making skills. Yet, neither cog-260
nitive fatigue, ∆χ2(2) = 2.8, p = .240, nor depression, ∆χ2(2) = 1.4, p = .477,
predicted working and semantic memory (Table 4). Consequently, depression
and cognitive fatigue unlikely explain why lower memory performance is asso-
ciated with lower decision making skills in individuals with MS.
4. Discussion265
Making informed, competent treatment and life decisions may pose a chal-
lenge for individuals with MS [33]. Facilitating those decisions has recently
attracted more attention because decision making skills affect treatment compli-
ance and adherence [5, 34, 35]. This study investigated to what degree memory
deficits carry over to decision making in individuals with MS. Using an estab-270
lished memory battery [25], we replicated previous findings that individuals with
MS show working memory deficits, whereas semantic memory is less impaired
[2]. Working memory was associated with semantic memory, matching findings
in a healthy sample [8].
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Compared to previous studies, we assessed decision making competence with275
the broad, multidimensional A-DMC battery [6]. Our analyses revealed that
limited working memory capacity predicted resistance to framing as well as the
capacity to follow decision rules [8]. In combination, these results indicate that
working memory deficits in MS may carry over to decisions that require to
focus on relevant information and suppress irrelevant information. Framing and280
communicating decision alternatives, such as treatment options, thoroughly may
thus be particularly important for MS patients with known working memory
impairments.
Semantic memory predicted over- and underconfidence, consistency in risk
perception as well as applying decision rules. Replicating previous findings285
[8], these associations highlight that every-day decision tasks often demand re-
trieving previously learned knowledge from long-term memory, ranging from
understanding complex instructions to judging the likelihood of events. It is
less clear why better semantic memory predicted a more accurate assessment of
one’s own knowledge. Potentially, raised awareness to their own memory fail-290
ures helps individuals with good semantic memory to still keep track of their
knowledge, but once semantic memory worsens, they are unable to assess their
lack of knowledge. In a shared decision-making setting, this might imply that
patients’ ability to monitor their disease-related knowledge worsens as a function
of cognitive decline.295
In contrast to previous work [36, 8], we did not find any association between
memory and resisting sunk costs. Potentially, depression in MS suppressed the
affect-laden processes underlying sunk cost effects [37]. This result might be
clinically relevant, as depressed patients might give up earlier on treatments
that do not show fast initial success.300
4.1. Limitations and future research
Although the majority of individuals with MS reported cognitive fatigue
and depressive symptoms, our results do not provide any evidence that those
clinical symptoms further aggravate memory impairments. These absent links
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resonate well with the notion that depression is not causally linked to cognitive305
abilities in MS [19, 20] and that cognitive fatigue does not consistently pre-
dict cognitive abilities [21]. Still, objective measures of fatigue could provide a
more fine-grained picture of the relationship between decision skills and memory
impairments in individuals with MS.
In our study, we followed a cross-sectional confirmatory approach to test310
which memory components underlie decision making in individuals with MS.
This approach comes at the cost of a comprehensive neurological and pharma-
cological assessment that may further shed light on the causes of memory and
decision making problems within MS. Brain atrophy as well as widespread mi-
croscopic brain tissue damage have been associated with distinct patterns of315
cognitive decline [38, 39] and may thus also impact differentially on decision
making. Unfortunately, our study lacks the necessary structural MRI data to
further investigate the neurological underpinnings of decision making deficits in
MS. In addition, it would be worthwhile to note if the memory impairments in
MS give rise to more severe impairments in decision making than in a healthy320
control group, a conclusion that can only be drawn from a design with a healthy
control group. Finally, we did not aim to cover all memory components. Fu-
ture work may more thoroughly investigate to what degree measures of episodic
memory or executive functioning, such as inhibition, contribute to accurate de-
cisions. This may help to design treatment information in such a way that325
individuals with MS can process this information easily and reach a decision
consistent with their goals and needs. Such a more naturalistic design may
further shed light on how integrating information in working memory affects
clinically relevant treatment decisions in MS.
5. Conclusion330
Memory impairments are frequently reported in MS. Our study suggests
that those impairments reach out to higher-order cognitive functions, such as
decision making. Improving treatment decisions in MS thus likely benefits from
14
acknowledging the patients’ memory limits and match the information provided
to the patient’s memory abilities.335
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Memory, Decision-Making Competence, and Clinical Mea-
sures
Measure M SD Min Max Skewness Kurtosis Reliability
Working memory .67
Digit Span 7.6 1.9 3 12 0.1 - 0.3
Verbal WM 15.2 3.6 2 21 - 0.9 0.7
Visual WM 12.1 5.0 1 21 - 0.2 - 1.0
Executive Control 14.5 5.7 2 25 - 0.1 - 0.8
Semantic memory .67
Object knowledge 97.2 3.4 68 100 - 5.0 38.4
Concept knowledge 97.3 4.2 73 100 - 2.3 7.7
Word knowledge 18.4 1.9 11 20 - 1.8 3.3
Factual knowledge 86.5 8.2 62 99 - 0.8 0.2
A-DMC
Resistance to Framing 3.9 0.7 1.2 5.0 - 0.9 1.5 .72∗
Under/Overconfidence .90 .07 .71 1.00 - 0.7 - 0.4 .56∗
Applying Decision Rules .67 .16 .13 .93 - 0.5 0.1 .68∗
Consistency in Risk Perception .77 .13 .35 1.00 - 0.6 0.3 .59∗
Resistance to Sunk Costs 4.5 0.7 2.30 6.00 - 0.5 0.0 .59∗
Clinical assessments
Cognitive Fatigue 32.1 10.0 10 49 - 0.5 - 0.9 .93∗
Depression 11.6 8.4 0 39 0.7 0.0 .93∗
EDSS 4.0 2.1 1 8 0.2 - 1.1 —†
Note. WM = working memory; A-DMC = Adult Decision-Making Competence; EDSS = Expanded
Disability Status Scale.  Composite reliability; ∗ Cronbach’s α; † EDSS score taken from medical
record
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Table 2: Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Memory
Model SRMR RMSEA CFI χ2 df SF p
WM + SM .06 .05 .93 25.9 19 1.3 .133
WM + SM (uncorrelated) .21 .13 .52 68.9 20 1.3 < .001
Unitary .07 .06 .89 31.6 20 1.3 .047
WM + SM (revised) .05 .04 .97 15.4 13 1.0 .282
Note. WM = working memory; SM = semantic memory; SRMR = standardized root-
mean-squared residual; RMSEA = root-mean-square error of approximation; CFI =
comparative fit index; SF = Scaling Factor.
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Table 3: Fit Indices for Models Predicting Decision Making with Memory
DM Model SRMR RMSEA CFI χ2 df SF p WM → DM SM → DM
RCA FP .05 .02 .98 19.4 18 1.0 .370 .31 (.13) .28 (.19)
WM .05 .03 .98 20.6 19 1.2 .359 .53 (.13) —
Null .14 .08 .77 36.7 20 1.5 .013 — —
CAL FP .05 .01 1.00 18.1 18 1.1 .452 -.11 (.17) .52 (.14)
WM .07 .07 .86 30.7 19 1.0 .044 .31 (.11) —
Null .11 .08 .80 36.3 20 1.1 .014 — —
DR FP .05 .04 .95 22.7 18 1.1 .201 .43 (.15) .28 (.13)
WM .06 .06 .92 27.0 19 1.0 .104 .65 (.09) —
SM .06 .05 .92 26.5 19 1.2 .116 — .64 (.08)
Null .16 .13 .53 66.8 20 1.2 .001 — —
RP FP .05 .02 .99 19.1 18 1.0 .387 .25 (.14) .22 (.13)
SM .05 .03 .96 21.9 19 1.0 .291 — .41 (.10)
Null .12 .07 .82 34.2 20 1.2 .025 — —
SC FP .06 .07 .85 29.4 18 1.1 .044 -.26 (.14) .31 (.19)
SM .07 .07 .83 31.6 19 1.1 .035 — .11 (.15)
Null .07 .06 .88 29.4 20 1.2 .080 — —
Note. The endorsed model is indicated in bold. Regression coefficients for memory on the decision task
are indicated by →. Standard errors in parentheses. DM = Decision Making Task; RCA = Resistance
to Framing; CAL = Under/Overconfidence; DR = Applying Decision Rules; RP = Consistency in Risk
Perception; SC = Resistance to Sunk Costs; FP = full-path model; WM = working memory; SM =
semantic memory; SRMR = standardized root-mean-squared residual; RMSEA = root-mean-square
error of approximation; CFI = comparative fit index.
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Table 4: Fit Indices for Models Predicting Memory with the Clinical Assessments
Scale SRMR RMSEA CFI χ2 df SF p CA → WM CA→ SM
Fatigue .07 .07 .83 42.4 25 1.0 .016 -.11 (.10) .06 (.08)
Depression .08 .07 .82 43.6 25 1.0 .012 .05 (.09) .11 (.10)
Null .08 .07 .82 45.6 27 1.0 .014 — —
Note. The endorsed model is indicated in bold. Regression coefficients for clinical assessments
on memory are indicated by →. Standard errors in parentheses. CA = Clinical Assessment; WM
= working memory; SM = semantic memory; SRMR = standardized root-mean-squared residual;
RMSEA = root-mean-square error of approximation; CFI = comparative fit index.
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